We consider a language containing partial predicates for subjective knowability and truth. For this language, inductive hierarchy rules are proposed which build up the extension and anti-extension of these partial predicates in stages. The logical interaction between the extension of the truth predicate and the anti-extension of the knowability predicate is investigated.
1 Introduction Kripke [10] develops a context-insensitive approach to the semantic paradoxes, in which the truth predicate is treated as a partial predicate. Toward the end of his paper he briefly considers extending his approach to notions other than truth, such as necessity ( [10] , pp. 78-79). He considers treating necessity as a predicate and giving its semantics in terms of the necessity operator and the truth predicate. Furthermore, he says:
We can even "kick away the ladder," and take Nec(x) [i.e., the necessity predicate] as a primitive, treating it in a possible-world scheme as if it were defined by an operator plus a truth predicate. Like remarks apply to the propositional attitudes, if we are willing to treat them, using possible worlds, like modal operators. (I myself [sic] think that such a treatment involves considerable philosophical difficulties.) It is possible that the present approach can be applied to the supposed predicates of sentences in question without using either intensional operators or possible worlds, but at present I have no idea how to do so. ( [10] , p. 75) Until today, there have been no published attempts to work out the suggestion that Kripke makes in the (first part of the) last sentence of this quotation. In the present paper it will be attempted to do this for knowledge predicates rather than for necessity predicates. 1 Toward the end of the paper some remarks are made on extending the approach of this paper to languages containing necessity predicates.
In the present paper, formal languages are considered which have a predicate (B) expressing the intuitive notion of subjective knowability, or knowability in principle (by a fixed knowing agent). 2 Theories of subjective knowability are generated by building up the extension and the anti-extension of B in stages that are indexed by ordinals. Theories of knowability in principle will be collections of sentences that are made true by models in which the partial interpretation of B is a fixed point of this inductive procedure: this is what makes the approach thoroughly Kripkean. In the first of our constructions, a truth predicate (T) is used as an auxiliary tool. It provides a convenient way to show that an inductive rule for building up the extension of B has a consistent fixed point. Later it is shown that the truth predicate can also be given a more substantial role, namely, when an investigation is made of the logical interaction of the concept of knowability and the concept of truth in a Kripkean context.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, two simple Kripkean hierarchy rules for knowability and truth are described, and some properties of these rules are established. It is shown that it is hard to see how the extension of the knowability predicate can be significantly enriched as the inductive rule goes through successor and limit stages. Nevertheless, the stronger hierarchy rules that are proposed in Section 3 describe ways of nontrivially enriching the anti-extension of the knowability predicate, which in turn leads to a nontrivial enrichment of the truth predicate. This makes the theory that is proposed here more about un knowability than about knowability (as one referee aptly put it). The final section compares the theory that is advanced here with some of the context-sensitive approaches to the epistemic paradoxes.
Simple Kripkean hierarchies of knowability and truth
Let us look at some knowability hierarchies in the context of a three-valued valuation scheme. We will use, besides a knowability predicate, a Kripkean truth predicate as an auxiliary notion. So let L PA TB be the language of first-order arithmetic extended with T ('truth') and B ('knowability') as our only partial predicates. In other words, some sentences are taken to be definitely knowable and some sentences are definitely unknowable. About other sentences it is indeterminate whether they are knowable or not.
In order to simplify notation, we will in the sequel write 
Definition 2.2 I n (B) +
α denotes the extension of B at stage α of the rule R n ; I n (B) − α denotes the anti-extension of B at stage α of the rule R n ; I n (T) + α denotes the exten-sion of T at stage α of the rule R n ; I n (T) − α denotes the anti-extension of T at stage α of the rule R n .
Then the following is a naïve way of defining a hierarchy rule R 0 for truth and knowability:
+ β for some β < γ for γ a limit ordinal;
The clauses of R 0 deserve some comment. We come to know facts about the natural numbers (and about the knowability and truth-value of such facts) by proving them.
In the present approach, we take these proofs to be carried out in a classical, twovalued language. Then it is natural to work with a supervaluation scheme, as is done in R 0 (clauses 3 and 4). It is also possible to work with a Kleene scheme. But then the clauses for defining the extension of B would have to be different: we would have to take the knower to prove things in partial Peano Arithmetic. 3 The successor clause for I 1 (B) + says that what the idealized knower knows at the successor stage is the closure of:
1. all sentences which she already knew at the previous stage; 2. that what she knew at the previous stage is true; 3. that the negations of these sentences are not true.
This seems to embody reasonable reflection properties for knowability. At limit stages, the knower reflects on the fact that she has proved A n for all natural numbers n and correctly concludes from this that ∀x A (x). In the hierarchy determined by R 0 , the knower "learns" about arithmetic and the notion of truth. We could strengthen R 0 a bit so that the knower also learns about knowledge. For this purpose, we would add to the extension of B at successor stages α + 1 also the sets B A | A ∈ I 1 (B)
Analogues of the propositions that we will prove for R 0 also hold for the resulting rule. 1 The inductive rule R 0 is in certain respects too strong.
The inductive rule R
The limit-clause for the extension of B implies that the extension of B at the least fixed point is closed under the infinitary ω-rule. But systems that are closed under the ω-rule prove all first-order arithmetical truths (see e.g., Hinman [7] , pp. 121-22).
So the least fixed point model of R 0 takes all arithmetical truths to be subjectively knowable. Even though great minds like Gödel and Hilbert have expressed sympathy for this consequence, many philosophers and mathematicians have taken issue with it. So philosophical caution seems to demand that at limit stages we let the extension of B be simply the union of the extensions of B at earlier stages. 4 But if we weaken R 0 in this way, then the extension of B at the least fixed point becomes uninteresting.
It is easy to see that it becomes the theory that is obtained by closing Peano Arithmetic under the inference rules:
Considerations such as these point to the fact that it is very difficult to see how inductive hierarchy rules can give an interesting account of how the extension of B "grows" in stages. Because of this, we will let the extension of B be constant throughout the stages of the hierarchy rules that will be formulated in the sequel. The extension of B should then be identified with a sufficiently strong axiomatic theory of truth and knowability. Reinhardt [12] argues in the context of a Kleene valuation scheme that the collection of all sentences A such that T( A) is provable in the Kripke-Feferman system constitutes a rich theory of truth. 5 But we are working in the context of a supervaluation scheme. Therefore it is more suitable to concentrate on Cantini's axiomatic theory VF . 6 Let VFT be the theory that consists of all sentences A such that T( A) is provable in VF . Then we will set the extension of B equal to VFT at all stages of the inductive rules that will henceforth be considered.
We have seen that the knower also ought to be capable of proving nontrivial propositions about knowability (and its relation to truth). This should lead one to consider extensions of VF by plausible axioms governing the notion of knowability. 7 The resulting proof systems would be interesting in their own right. 8 Nevertheless, such a proof-theoretic investigation would detract from the model-theoretic investigation that we are currently engaged in. Therefore, this line will not be pursued further here.
Since we have decided to let the extension of B coincide with VFT already at stage 0, we have to ensure that VFT is also included in the extension of T at stage 0 of our inductive rules. 9 This can be done in the following way. Consider the classical supervaluation rule S. Identify the extension (anti-extension) of T at stage 0 with the extension (anti-extension) of T at the least fixed point F of S (where B is treated as a partial predicate of which the extension and anti-extension remain empty at all stages). It is easy to see that the least fixed point F of S makes all axioms of VF true
Here then is a simple but intuitively sound hierarchy rule R 1 : We go on to prove some simple propositions about R 1 which will be shared by the stronger hierarchy rules that will be proposed in subsequent sections.
Simple properties of R 1

Proposition 2.3 R 1 is monotone in B and T.
Proof: It suffices to note that |= sv is monotone.
Proposition 2.4 For all A and α: if A ∈ I 1 (B)
+ is constant, the only nontrivial case is when α = 0. But this follows from the fact that F makes all theorems of VF true.
Proposition 2.5 For all α, I 1 (T)
If there is at least β for which the property fails, then it must be a successor ordinal. Let β = α + 1 be the least such ordinal. This means that we have an A ∈ I 1 (T)
, and it is given that I 1 (T)
Given the previous propositions it follows that R 1 reaches a consistent least fixed point in both T and B. We now show that the extension of B at the least fixed point of R 1 is sound, in the following sense.
Proposition 2.6 Consider the least fixed point I
, whereby
So by closing off (which we can by the previous proposition), we see that
Some easy fixed point calculations
First we consider the absolute Gödel sentence, which says of itself that it is unknowable in principle.
Proposition 2.7 Let G be such that PA
In other words, according to R 1 , the absolute Gödel sentence is absolutely undecidable by the knowing agent. Note that the reasoning of the above proposition holds for any consistent fixed point of R 1 .
Proposition 2.8 Let G be as in the previous proposition. Then G, ¬G /
∈ I 1 (T)
Proof:
Only the last step of this last proof will not go through for the stronger inductive rules that will be considered in the next section. And intuitively it is not clear that it should go through: there may be sentences which are definitely unprovable but which are nevertheless definitely true. Actually, there is a familiar Gödelian argument to show that G should really be in the extension of the truth predicate. For suppose that the absolute Gödel sentence is knowable in principle. If it is knowable, then it is true. But it says of itself that it is unknowable! So we reach a contradiction. Therefore G must be unknowable. But since this is exactly what it says of itself, it must be true. 10 On the other hand, this argument certainly has the flavor of strengthened liar-type reasoning. And at least in the case of truth, we know that strengthened liar arguments lead to serious trouble. In the Gödelian argument under consideration, the suspicious step is the move from the inconsistency of the assumption that G is knowable to the conclusion that G is (definitely!?) unknowable. One might seriously wonder whether such a principle will not, in the present setting, necessarily lead to contradictions. This question will be taken up in Section 3.
Next we consider the knower sentence, 11 which says of its own negation that it is subjectively knowable.
Proposition 2.9 Let K be such that PA
So according to R 1 the knower sentence is also absolutely undecidable by the knowing agent. Proposition 2.10 Let K be as in the previous proposition. Then K, ¬K / ∈ I 1 (T)
Here again only the last step of the last proof will not go through for the stronger inductive rules that will be considered in the next section. And by a parallel argument to that for the truth of G, one might ask whether K should not really be in the anti-extension of the truth predicate. For suppose that the negation of K is knowable. Then the negation of K must be true. But since K says of itself that its negation is knowable, we obtain that its negation must be unknowable. But this contradicts the assumption. So the negation of K is unknowable. But since K says of itself that its negation is knowable, it must be false. 12 By arguments similar to those for G and K one can convince oneself that neither the liar sentence (L) nor its negation belong to the extension or the anti-extension of B or T (this is left to the reader). Also, the question can be raised whether L and ¬L should not really be in the anti-extension of B. For the familiar liar argument shows that from the assumption that L is true, a contradiction can easily be derived: if L is true, then ¬L, whereby it is not the case that L is true. Since it is therefore inconsistent to assume that L is true, L must be determinately unknowable. Here the suspicious principle is the move that allows one to conclude from the inconsistency of assuming that a sentence is true to the conclusion that it is definitely unknowable. But note that this principle is weaker than the suspicious principle involved in the Gödelian argument for the truth of G.
In sum, the previous propositions show that the knower sentence and the absolute Gödel sentence behave as one would at first blush expect on a Kripkean picture, but one wonders whether it is possible to construct arguably sound inductive rules for which the least fixed point verifies G, falsifies K, and takes both L and ¬L to be definitely unknowable. 
We also introduce notation to refer to the structure that has been defined by the αth stage of a rule R i .
Definition 3.4 S
When it is clear from the context which rule we are referring to, we will sometimes omit the superscript from S i α . Now we define R 2 to be the inductive rule which is just like R 1 , except for the fact that the successor clause for I (B) − α+1 now reads:
In other words, at successor stages α + 1 we add to the anti-extension of B those sentences ϕ which are such that if ϕ were assumed to be true and the hierarchy were continued in accordance with the rule R 1 from stage α onward, then I (T) + β would become inconsistent for some β. The underlying idea is that if assuming ϕ to be true would lead, according to some correct rule, to an inconsistency at some stage, then that sentence ϕ is definitely unknowable. Or, shorter still, if it is inconsistent for a given sentence to be true, then it is definitely unknowable.
As with R 1 , it will be shown that R 2 has a consistent least fixed point. In addition it will be shown that the least fixed point of R 2 makes certain sentences which R 1 classifies as neither determinately knowable nor determinately unknowable, come out definitely unknowable. As we will see, one such sentence is the knower sentence of Section 2.4.
All 
The proof is the same as for Proposition 2.4.
Note that we retrieve Proposition 2.4 from this more general proposition by taking
U = I 1 (B) 0 , I 1 (T) 0 .
Proposition 3.6 R 2 is monotone in T and B.
Proof: By transfinite induction: first we note that R 1 always preserves monotonicity when it is used as an auxiliary rule. For this we are using the fact that for all α, 
T, U)
+ γ is inconsistent. In the former disjunct, we have A ∈ I 2 (B)
. But the latter disjunct is also acceptable. For take any normal U * ⊇ S β+1 such that U * |= sv A. Since S β+1 ⊇ S β , we have U * ⊇ S β . So, by the inductive hypothesis,
Case 3: α is a limit ordinal γ. Then there is a smallest θ < γ such that A ∈ I 2 (B)
+ γ is inconsistent for some γ. Now take any normal U * ⊇ S γ such that U * |= sv A. Since S γ ⊇ S θ , we have U * ⊇ S θ . So by the inductive hypothesis, I 1 (T, U * ) + γ must be inconsistent for some γ. So for either disjunct we have A ∈ I 2 (B) − γ+1 .
Proposition 3.7 For all α: (a) I 2 (T)
Proof: By a double induction. Suppose that there is a least α for which the property fails. Then it must be a successor ordinal. Let β = α + 1 be the least such ordinal. 
We proceed by an induction on γ (so this is the induction inside the main induction). It suffices to look at successor ordinals, so suppose there is a least ordinal γ = δ + 1 for which this property fails. By the inductive hypothesis we cannot have an A ∈ I 1 T, S α+1
Subcase 1: Suppose there is an
, we would contradict the fact that I 1 T, S α+1 It follows from these propositions that R 2 has a consistent least fixed point which has a model in the natural numbers.
Note that in R 2 there is real logical interaction between the knowability predicate and the truth predicate: the anti-extension of B at α depends on putative later extensions of T, and the anti-extension of B at α, of course, codetermines the extension of T at stage α + 1. The extension of the truth predicate is thereby enriched by the anti-extension of the knowability predicate in a way that cannot be obtained in a similar way in a language which has only one partial predicate (for truth). All this is made possible by the conceptual relation between knowability and truth: knowability entails truth, so not being definitely true entails being definitely unprovable (but does not in general entail being definitely false!). Since this conceptual relation also holds between necessity and truth, something similar can be done for a language with partial predicates for truth and necessity. Note that we did not make use of the normality of U in this proof.
Proof: This is similar to the proof of the previous proposition.
The absolute Gödel sentence does not belong to the anti-extension of B at the least fixed point of R 2 .
Proof: We must show that for each S α , there is a normal U ⊇ S α such that U |= sv G and I 1 (T, U) + β is consistent for each β. Consider an arbitrary S α . We form a partial structure U by adding G to the anti-extension of B of S α . Then U |= sv ¬B (G),
For otherwise G would belong to the extension of B of S α , whereby G would belong to the anti-extension of T of S α , contradicting the normality of S α . Moreover, it is easy to see that the extension and the anti-extension of B and T cannot become overlapping after an application of the successor clause of
This, of course, implies that G does not come out true at the least fixed point of R 2 .
In order to make the absolute Gödel sentence come out true at the least fixed point we need to consider an inductive rule that is stronger than R 2 .
3.3
The rule R 3 The rule R 3 is defined exactly like R 2 except that the successor clause for I (B) − α+1 now reads:
The motivating idea behind R 3 is that if it is inconsistent to assume that a sentence ϕ is knowable, then ϕ is definitely unknowable. This rule will allow us to classify the absolute Gödel sentence as definitely true.
Properties of R 3
Proposition 3.11 R 3 is monotone in T and B.
Proof: The proof is the same as for Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.12 If U is normal, then for all β:
The proof is the same as for Proposition 3.5. It is easy to see that R 3 is at least as strong as R 2 .
Proposition 3.13 For all α:
(a) I 3 (T) + α ∩ I 3 (T) − α = I 3 (B) + α ∩ I 3 (B) − α = ∅.
Proposition 3.14 For all A, if A ∈ I 2 (T)
Proof: It suffices to note that, by normality, if for all normal U ⊇ S such that U |= sv A there is a β such that I 1 (T, U) + β is inconsistent, then if S ⊆ S * , it must be the case that for all U * ⊇ S * such that U * |= sv B ( A) there is a β such that I 1 (T, U * ) + β is inconsistent. The result then follows by monotonicity.
In fact, R 3 is stronger: it classifies the absolute Gödel sentence as true. , that is,
And since we are at a fixed point, we have G ∈ I 3 (T)
G is an example of a sentence which is in I 3 (B)
− α for any α. By using suitable coding techniques, for each successor stage α + 1 which is smaller than the closure ordinal of R 3 , a new sentence can be found which is in I 3 (B) − α+1 but which does not belong to the anti-extension of B at any stage of the inductive rule which is just like R 3 until stage α and like R 1 afterward. 13 So there is a strong sense in which R 3 is an extension of R 1 . For instance, take the sentence G such that
It is not hard to see that G first enters the anti-extension of B of R 3 at stage 2. G never enters the anti-extension of B of the rule which is like R 3 until stage 1 and like R 1 afterward. 
Since also
So the least fixed point of R 3 makes the absolute knower sentence come out false, which is in line with our intuitions about this sentence. Sentences involving iterated knowability predicates behave in essentially the same way. For instance, take a sentence K such that it is provable in PA TB that K ←→ BB(¬K ). An argument much like the previous one shows that ¬K is also in the extension of the truth predicate at the least fixed point of R 3 . Again, this is in line with our intuitions about such sentences. 3 The philosophical argument that was given in Section 3.1 for the intuitive soundness of R 2 does not carry over to the stronger rule R 3 . Prima facie the fact that it is inconsistent for a sentence A to be knowable does not by itself ensure that it is definitely unknowable. For how can we be sure that in such cases there always is a fact of the matter whether A is knowable? I will argue against this that R 3 's successor clause for the extension of B does have a considerable degree of plausibility. Nevertheless, the support that I am able to give for R 3 is admittedly significantly weaker than the philosophical support that was adduced for R 2 .
On the philosophical motivation of R
R 3 can be motivated by means of a comparison with the kind of reasoning that is involved in our evaluation of the liar sentence:
Using the left-to-right direction (T (L) → L) of the naïve Tarskian truth scheme, we see that it is inconsistent to assume that L is true. In normal circumstances this would be taken as ample reason to conclude that L is false. After all, this would just be a simple instance of a reduction ad absurdum inference. But in the present case there are overriding reasons against drawing this inference. For we can use the right-to-left direction (L → T (L)) of the Tarskian truth scheme to show that it is equally inconsistent to hold that L is false. Hence, we conclude in a Kripkean spirit that L has no determinate truth value.
Compare this with an evaluation of the absolute Gödel sentence: G Sentence G is subjectively unknowable.
We have seen in Section 2.4 how an instance of the reflexivity principle B ( A) → A can be used to show that it is inconsistent to assume that G is subjectively knowable. Thus we are again strongly tempted to conclude from our reductio that G should be classified as subjectively unknowable. And this time there is no overriding reason to resist this temptation. For to argue, by analogy with our argument concerning the liar sentence, that it is also inconsistent to hold that G is unknowable, one would need to appeal to the converse A → B ( A) of the reflection principle for subjective knowability. But this is a principle that has very little intuitive appeal. In this way one obtains the impression that there can be no overriding reasons against concluding from the inconsistency of the knowability of a sentence to its determinate unknowability (unlike the parallel situation for the notion of truth). And in the absence of such overriding considerations, one ought not to resist the intuitive pull of reductio ad absurdum-type of inference patterns. In sum, since we have evidence for it (its intuitive plausibility) and no threat of overriding evidence against it (inconsistencies), we have good reasons to believe the clause for the anti-extension of B to be intuitively sound.
So we have good reasons for believing that R 3 is indeed a coherent inductive rule and that it classifies certain paradoxical sentences in what appears to be the "right" way. Of course, it does not follow from this that, perhaps in the context of some additional justifiable constraints, R 3 does not classify some other paradoxical sentences in the "wrong" way (although I have been unable to come up with such examples). As was said before, there is no getting away from the fact that R 2 is substantially more secure than R 3 .
Further issues and open problems
It would seem that the rules R 2 and R 3 give rise to a hierarchy of inductive rules. In R 2 , for instance, R 1 is used as an auxiliary rule. But since we now know R 2 to be an unobjectionable inductive rule, the rule R 2 , which is just like R 2 except that its auxiliary rule is R 2 instead of R 1 , is also unobjectionable, and so on. It is clear that the resulting hierarchy of inductive rules must have a least fixed point. But I am at present unable to see whether there are sentences in the extension of the truth predicate according to R 2 which are not also in the extension of the truth predicate according to R 2 . In other words, for all I know this hierarchy of inductive rules may reach a fixed point very quickly.
Of course there are complexity questions even for R 2 and R 3 . On the one hand, their extensions are at least as complex as the extension of T in the least fixed model of the classical Kripkean construction with supervaluations, so they are at least 1 1 (see Burgess [4] ). But they are also at most 1 1 , because any inductively defined set (over the standard model of arithmetic) is 1 1 , even if inductive definitions are iterated (see e.g., [7] , pp. 89-90). So their complexity is exactly 1 1 . 14 In the inductive rules that we have considered, the extension of B was kept constant at all stages. If we would concentrate on necessity instead of knowability, things would be somewhat different. First, it would seem to be more natural to work with a Kleene scheme than with supervaluations. But second, we could let the extension of the necessity predicate coincide with the extension of the truth predicate at all stages.
For if a sentence ϕ of L PA TB is definitely true, then it is so in virtue of facts about the natural numbers and facts about the logical properties of truth and necessity. But since these facts are all necessary, ϕ must be necessary also. So the extension of the necessity predicate would be as complex as the extension of the truth predicate.
Comparison with context-sensitive approaches
Context-sensitive theories of the paradoxes have been proposed in order to validate certain types of intuitively correct strengthened-liar-type reasoning concerning semantic and epistemic notions. The way in which they are able to deal with the epistemic paradoxes is generally considered one of the strengths of these approaches. 15 Within the context-sensitive tradition there are several proposals as to how the epistemic paradoxes should be handled. In Burge's and in Gaifman's versions of the theory, truth and falsehood accrues to tokens of sentences. On such an account the sentence token,
G
Sentence G is subjectively unknowable.
has no truth-value, but by that very fact a distinct token of the sentence type will be true ( [9] , p. 125). On Barwise and Etchemendy's Austinian account, truth and falsity accrues to propositions which have an implicit situation index built in. On this account, the proposition expressed by G asserts that its own knowability is not contained in the situation s to which G is restricted. This proposition is considered true, but the proof witnessing that it is true does not belong to situation s ( [9] , p. 128). The fact witnessing the truth of G does, however, belong to a more comprehensive situation s . A similar analysis is given of other intuitively paradoxical epistemic sentences such as the knower sentence.
It would appear at first sight that-short of moving up to the metalanguagethe context-insensitive theories would find it difficult to recognize a sense in which sentences such as the absolute Gödel sentence and the knower sentence have a definite truth-value. For instance in [11] , which purports to give a Kripkean, contextinsensitive theory of knowledge, the absolute Gödel sentence and the knower sentence are left without a truth-value.
Nevertheless, the context-insensitive theory that was sketched in the present paper yields evaluations that are more in consonance with the strengthened-liar-type evaluations of the context-sensitive approaches. On this account the absolute Gödel sentence is definitely true and the knower sentence is definitely false. But the proofs of these facts are inaccessible to the knowing agent: the truth of the absolute Gödel sentence and the falsity of the knower sentence cannot be established "from the inside."
